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Introduction 
 
 
At long last, the Serious Fraud Office 2 has received a major boost in its 
prosecution of bribery. Serious Fraud Office v Standard Bank PLC 3 is a landmark 
case because it is not only the first case where the SFO has looked to prosecute a 
commercial organisation for failure to prevent bribery under Bribery Act 2010,4 
but the first occasion where it has sought to enter a Deferred Prosecution 
Agreement 5 under Crime and Courts Act 2013.6 
 
Background to Deferred prosecution Agreements in the United Kingdom 
 
In the United States of America,7 the prosecution authorities, the Department of 
Justice 8 and the Securities and Exchange Commission,9 have deployed DPAs for 
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many years and obtained significant income from fines.10 In essence, this 
involved a process of ‘plea bargaining’. In the US, because of the high probability 
of conviction on indictment, most cases are dealt with by the defendant ‘pleading 
guilty at an early stage of the process in exchange for a reduced sentence.’ This 
conserves resources for cases which merit a full trial.11  The attractions of 
utilising DPAs were not lost on the SFO and, indeed, it was a key 
recommendation of a review into the SFO’s operations.12 With the same objective 
in mind of expeditiousness and cost-effectiveness [authors emphasis], and in 
parallel with its policy to engage with corporates through self-referral, the SFO 
endeavoured to respond to exhortations to adopt a more modern, or 
transatlantic, approach. It is important to briefly mention the cost-effectiveness 
of the DPA process and how this relates to the SFO since a series of harsh budget 
restraints that have been imposed since 2010.  For example, since the creation of 
the Coalition government in 2010, the SFO, like many other government 
departments and agencies, has had its budget cut as part of a glut of extensive 
austerity measures.  For example, the annual budget of the SFO in was £43.3m, in 
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2008/2009 it was £53.2m, in 2009/2010 the figure reduced to £40.1m, in 
2010/2011 it was £35.5m, in 2011/2012 the annual budget of the SFO was 
£31.5m and this will reduce to £34.8m in 2012/2013, £32.1m in 2013/2014 and 
£30.8m in 2014/2015.13  The decision to reduce the budget of the SFO, at a time 
where white collar crime has increased and the duties of the SFO have been 
expanded to incorporate the enforcement of the Bribery Act 2010, has been 
questioned and criticised.14  However, it is important to note that fraud is an 
extremely difficult criminal offence to detect, prosecute and expensive to 
enforce.15  This was clearly illustrated by the 1994 SFO prosecution of Virani, in 
which 50% of the trial costs was associated with accountants who assisted with 
the prosecution.16   
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This entailed changing tack to negotiate outcomes with defendants in order to 
realise the advantages of cost savings and certainty, which has not been without 
difficulty. In two cases the SFO plea with defendants caused tensions with the 
judiciary. Firstly, in Innospec,17 the Court of Appeal criticised the SFO for 
‘usurping’ the Judge’s authority by agreeing punishment. Secondly, in Dougall 18 
the Judge rejected SFO claims for leniency. Since these cases would appear to be 
part of a “programme (...) instituted to encourage whistleblowing by city 
insiders, lawyers and accountants and to expand the SFO’s role in public anti-
fraud initiatives”,19 judicial antipathy was of clear concern.  
 
Shortly after his appointment as Director of the SFO, David Green outlined his 
vision and stated that “I am keen on maximising the set of tools available to SFO 
as an investigation and prosecuting agency, and DPAs represent a new and 
imaginative tool to deal with serious economic crime committed by commercial 
organisations”. Green considered that “[four] very important principles need to 
be observed: firstly that “sentencing in this jurisdiction is for the judge not the 
prosecution ( )”, and [secondly] “corporates cannot be seen to be allowed some 
special kid glove treatment ( ) individuals will be prosecuted where that is the 
appropriate course of action ( ) [lastly] admissions as to conduct must be 
realistic, factual and not fanciful”.20 
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Some eighteen months later, DPA’s became available to the SFO by virtue of the 
Crime and Courts Act 2013.21 A DPA, which is a discretionary tool,22 is subject to 
court approval.23 The prosecutors are either the Director of Public Prosecutions 
or the Director of the SFO, with the Act making it clear that powers to enter into a 
DPA must be exercised personally by the designated prosecutor.24 The Act 
specifies the “persons who may enter into a DPA with a prosecutor”, which are in 
three categories: “P may be a body corporate, a partnership or an 
unincorporated association, but may not be an individual”.25 This latter provision 
differs from the US so that in the UK, ‘DPA’s will not be available for individuals, 
whether for individual crimes or for action undertaken on behalf of an 
organisation.26 
The expectation was that a DPA would be likely to be available to companies 
which “self-report suspected criminal misconduct to SFO”. 27  In such 
circumstances, the SFO would launch a formal criminal investigation to test the 
evidence and scale of offending. The SFO’s position is that:  
“The available evidence may well pass the evidential test. But if the 
company has taken appropriate disciplinary action against those 
responsible, made appropriate amendments to its compliance regime, 
compensated victims, and genuinely and proactively cooperated with the 
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SFO investigation, it is hard to see how it would be in the public interest to 
prosecute the company, as opposed to individuals”.28 
The SFO warn that “if the corporate chooses to bury the misconduct rather than 
self-report, the risks attendant on discovery are truly unquantifiable”.29 The 
expectation has been that the first DPA, subject to judicial supervision, would 
signal the future use of this mechanism and “as experience is built up by all 
parties, this will generate consistency and therefore predictability around the 
likelihood of achieving a DPA”.30  The reasoning for this is that “the most likely 
candidate for the first DPA will be the type of case that would attract the lowest 
level of fine on a plea of guilty if proceedings were to take place”.31 The clear 
issue for the SFO is that although it might well wish to avail itself of the new 
facility, given the history of judicial opprobrium, the SFO would not wish to risk 
an adverse outcome and the attendant publicity, of its first DPA presentation to 
court. Thus, it may be that the first cases of significance are still more distant. 
 
Serious Fraud Office v Standard Bank PLC 
 
This case involved Standard Bank PLC, a UK bank and a subsidiary of Standard 
Bank Group Ltd, a South African public company.32 The Group was also the 
ultimate parent of Stanbic Bank Tanzania Ltd (Stanbic), a Tanzanian company. 
The Government of Tanzania wished to raise funds and Stanbic, which was not 
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licensed to undertake this type of transaction, engaged Standard Bank which was 
licensed. Originally in February 2012, Standard Bank / Stanbic quoted a fee of 
1.4% of gross proceeds raised, later Stanbic Increased the proposed fee to 2.4%, 
because 1% would be paid to a local Tanzanian partner, Enterprise Growth 
Market Advisors Limited (EGMA). Two of EGMA’s three directors and 
shareholders was Commissioner of Tanzania Revenue Authority and, as such, a 
serving member of the Tanzania Government. A second director was formerly 
Chief Executive of Tanzanian Capital Markets and Securities Authority. The case 
was heard by a senior judge (Leveson P) who noted that the potential for conflict 
and risk was evident but not addressed by Stanbic. In November 2012, Standard 
Bank/ Stanbic were formally appointed by the Government of Tanzania to raise 
funds which, when completed in March 2013, amounted to $600m. Stanbic paid 
$6m to EGMA, most of which was withdrawn in cash within 10 days. 
 
Stanbic staff raised concerns about these withdrawals, escalated their concerns 
to Standard Bank Group in South Africa, which commenced an investigation on 
April 2 2013. Standard Bank in London, without carrying out an investigation, 
instructed its law firm on April 17 to report the matter to the authorities, which 
it did within seven days to the Serious and Organised Crime Agency and the 
SFO.33 
 
The issue facing the SFO was consideration of the conduct of Standard Bank. The 
judgment makes clear that the predicate bribery offence was allegedly 
committed by two senior executives of Stanbic, involved the intention to bribe a 
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foreign public official, use of public funds to make the bribe payment and could 
have compromised the integrity of the financial market. However, that was not 
Standard Bank’s conduct, because Stanbic was a sister company of Standard 
Bank within the South African Standard Bank Group. The SFO had concluded that 
there was insufficient evidence to suggest that any of Standard Bank’s employees 
had committed an offence or knew that two senior executives of Stanbic 
intended the payment to constitute a bribe.34 
 
The SFO, having reached the conclusion that there was insufficient evidence 
against employees of Standard Bank in relation to the bribe payment, with the 
consequence that the Bribery Act 2010 offence of “bribery of foreign public 
officials” 35 was not available, considered whether Standard Bank could have 
prevented the bribery.36 The “failure of commercial organisations to prevent 
bribery” is an offence under the Bribery Act 2010:37 
“A relevant commercial organisation... is guilty of an offence under this 
section if a person... associated with [the organisation] bribes another 
person intending—  
(a) to obtain or retain business for [the organisation], or  
(b) to obtain or retain an advantage in the conduct of business for [the 
organisation].” 38 
A complete defence to this offence is for a commercial organisation to have had 
in place adequate procedures designed to prevent persons associate with the 
commercial organisation from undertaking such conduct.39 
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The offence of failure of commercial organisations to prevent bribery and the 
defence of having adequate procedures had not prior to this case been tested in 
court and, as such, represent a significant development in the field of anti-
bribery and corruption. In this case, Stanbic is an associate of Standard Bank and 
they had different management. In order for Standard Bank to avail themselves 
of the “adequate procedures” defence, they would have to demonstrate a clear 
policy.40 However, the judgment found that the policy was unclear, was not re-
enforced effectively through to the team dealing with the fundraising through 
communication and training. The failure to provide sufficient guidance on 
relevant obligation and procedures where two group companies were involved, 
led to a transaction with a government of a high risk country with checks on a 
third party undertaken by a sister company where Standard Bank had no 
interest, oversight, control or involvement. Standard Bank did not undertake 
enhanced due diligence processes, did not identify the presence of politically 
exposed persons not the change in arrangements with the introduction of a third 
party charging a substantial fee. The judgment concludes that an anti-corruption 
culture was not effectively demonstrated within Standard Bank as regards the 
transaction at issue. 
 
The outcome of this consideration whereby the SFO found that Standard Bank 
had failed to prevent bribery in circumstances where it could not avail itself of 
the defence of ‘adequate procedures’, is the indictment in the final judgment: 
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“Standard Bank PLC, now known as ICBC Standard Bank PLC, between 1st 
day of June 2012 and the 31st day of March 2013, failed to prevent a person 
or persons associated with Standard Bank PLC, namely Stanbic Bank 
Tanzania Limited and / or Bashir Awale and / or Shose Sinare, from 
committing bribery in circumstances which they intended to obtain or 
retain business or an advantage in the conduct of business for Standard 
Bank PLC, namely by:  
(i) Promising and/or giving EGMA Limited 1% of the monies raised or to be 
raised by Standard Bank PLC and Standard Bank Tanzania Limited for the 
Government of Tanzania, where EGMA Limited was not providing any or 
any reasonable consideration for this payment; and  
(ii) Intending thereby to induce a representative or representatives of the 
Government of Tanzania to perform a relevant function or activity 
improperly, namely, showing favour to Standard Bank PLC and Stanbic 
Bank Tanzania in the process of appointing or retaining them in order to 
raise the said monies”.41  
The next consideration is whether the interests of justice would be served by 
entering a DPA as opposed to prosecution. The SFO has to demonstrate to the 
court that the proposed DPA is in the interests of justice and the proposed terms 
of the agreement are fair, reasonable and proportionate.42 The reason for this is 
that the prosecutor has to approach the court after negotiations have 
commenced. A critical element of the UK DPA procedures is the requirement that 
the court examines the proposed agreement in detail. This is different from the 
US.43 The first hearing is held in private, in this case on November 4 2015, with 
the preliminary judgment published, if approved, with the final judgment. 
 
The key issues for Standard Bank are: the seriousness of the conduct which, in 
this case, is that of Stanbic rather than Standard Bank; the immediate self-report 
to SOCA and SFO; co-operation with the SFO; and history of similar conduct 
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involving prior criminal, civil and regulatory enforcement actions. Standard Bank 
did immediately report to SFO and instructed its solicitors to investigate and 
disclose its finding to SFO, which it did on 21 July 2014. The SFO gave credit for 
self-reporting a matter which might otherwise have remained unknown to it and, 
bearing in mind the report came from Stanbic via Standard Bank Group, the 
conduct might not otherwise have come to the attention of the SFO. However, the 
judge makes plain that mere self-reporting is not sufficient: the organisation 
must not withhold material which would jeopardise an effective investigation 
and prosecution. In this case, Standard Bank conducted a detailed internal 
investigation, sanctioned by and reported to SFO.  This information appears in 
the published Statement of Facts.44 
 
The question of previous conduct is of interest: has Standard Bank been subject 
to prior criminal, civil or regulatory enforcement action? Here, Standard Bank 
has not been convicted for bribery and corruption nor has it previously been 
investigated by SFO. However, it has been subject to enforcement action by the 
Financial Conduct Authority for failing in its anti-money laundering 
procedures.45 The judgment confirms that by April 2014, the FCA had accepted a 
report that Standard Bank had taken extensive steps to remediate pre-existing 
failures. 
 
This step-by-step approach, with the additional consideration that the entity of 
Standard Bank had changed, allowed the court to agree that the conduct of 
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Standard Bank could be dealt with by a DPA, subject to terms. This is of 
particular interest because at the time DPAs became available, commentators 
thought that “the most likely candidate for the first DPA will be the type of case 
that would attract the lowest level of fine on a plea of guilty if proceedings were 
to take place”.46 Standard Bank is not such a case.  In this instance, the court 
stated that: 
  
“the requirements falling upon Standard Bank which the court declared were 
likely to be in the interests of justice and were fair, reasonable and proportionate 
are as follows:  
I. payment of compensation of US $6 million plus interest in US 
$1,046,196.58;  
II. Disgorgement of profit on the transaction of US $8.4m;  
III. Payment of a financial penalty of US $16.8 m;  
IV. Past and future co-operation with the relevant authorities (as further 
described) in all matters relating to the conduct arising out of the 
circumstances of the draft Indictment; 
V. At its own expense, commissioning and submitting to an independent 
review of its existing internal anti-bribery and corruption controls, 
policies and procedures regarding compliance with the Bribery Act 2010 
and other applicable anti-corruption laws (as further described); and  
VI. Payment of the costs incurred by the SFO”.47  
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The preliminary judgment provides a detailed explanation of the rationale for 
the various terms. The Government of Tanzania is to receive compensation for 
the additional 1% fee paid to EGMA, together with interest and with the 1.4% fee 
which Stanbic and Standard Bank received for arranging the transaction.48 In 
addition, the SFO’s costs of £330,000 are to be covered. The major financial 
element, though, is the payment of a financial penalty of $16.8m to H M Treasury 
(Consolidated Fund).49 The judge described this as the most difficult assessment 
and referred to the requirements of the Crime and Courts Act 2013 which states 
that the financial penalty should be “broadly comparable to the fine that a court 
would have imposed” following conviction after a guilty plea. The detailed 
analysis commences with the gross profit earned on the transaction of $8.4m and 
applied the Sentencing Council Guidelines in respect of Fraud, Bribery and 
Money Laundering Offences,50 with a greater than medium level assessment of 
harm leading to a multiplication of 300%, reduced by one third to reflect the 
early guilty plea. 
 
The financial provisions of the DPA could have been dealt with by a guilty plea in 
court but the purpose of the DPA, which will expire on November 30 2018, is for 
the other conditions of cooperation with the authorities and commissioning and 
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submitting to an independent review of its existing internal anti-bribery and 
corruption controls as contemplated in the Crime and Courts Act 2013.51 
 
Conclusion 
 
The SFO has achieved a double first in Serious Fraud Office v Standard Bank 
PLC. 52  This is the first occasion the SFO has prosecuted a commercial 
organisation for failure to prevent bribery in a case which has provided the first 
opportunity to enter into a DPA. The facts are such that the SFO was only able to 
investigate that failure, rather than the bribery itself which falls within the 
purview of the Government of Tanzania which, the judge was told, has opened its 
own investigation into Stanbic. The key element of this case was the promptness 
of the self-report, the fully disclosed internal investigation and co-operation of 
Standard Bank, upon which the judge and SFO commented approvingly.53 The 
question of ‘justice being delayed is justice denied’ is not the case in this matter. 
The agreement between the parties was held by the court to be in the interests of 
justice, the terms and supporting documents have been published so that the 
entirety of the process is open to public scrutiny, and the Respondent, Standard 
Bank, has had to make immediate payments totalling $32.6m, and a further 
$4.2m to US authorities.54 Furthermore, Standard Bank has given undertakings 
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to the SFO relating to its corporate compliance programme in the DPA.55 A 
particular benefit to Standard Bank is that this matter, which commenced in 
2012, where the transaction took place in March 2013, reporting to SFO in April 
2013, investigation report in July 2014, did not enter the public domain until 30 
November 2015. Thus, by self-reporting and working with the SFO, Standard 
Bank was able to ensure the matter remained confidential, rather than being 
subject to publicity because of an announcement by SFO that had accepted a case 
for formal investigation. This is the first DPA which the SFO believes will serve as 
a template for future agreements.56 There will, thus, be much interest in the next 
case. 
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